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Background:
A recently completed study at Georgia Tech examined various launch vehicle options for
deploying a future constellation of Space Solar Power satellites of the Suntower configuration. One
of the motivations of the study was to determine whether the aggressive $400/kg launch price goal
established for SSP package delivery would result in an attractive economic scenario for a future
RLV developer. That is, would the potential revenue and traffic to be derived from a large scale
SSP project be enough of an economic "carrot" to attract an RLV company into developing a new,
low cost launch vehicle to address this market. Preliminary results presented in the attached charts
show that there is enough economic reward for RLV developers, specifically in the case of the
latest large GEO-based Suntower constellations (over 15,500 MT per year delivery for 30 years).
For that SSP model, internal rates of return for the 30 year economic scenario exceed 22%.
However, up-front government assistance to the RLV developer in terms of ground facilities,
operations technologies, guaranteed low-interest rate loans, and partial offsets of some vehicle
development expenses is necessary to achieve these positive results.
This white paper is meant to serve as a companion to the data supplied in the accompanying
charts. It's purpose is to provide more detail on the vehicles and design processes used, to
highlight key decisions and issues, and to emphasize key results from each phase of the Georgia
Tech study.
Candidate Vehicle Descriptions:
As a point of departure, Georgia Tech started with the three top finishing launch vehicle
designs and one additional "wildcard" from NASA's recent Highly Reusable Space Transportation
(HRST) study. The HRST study had a goal of achieving direct recurring costs under $400/kg
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($200/1b) for payloads in the range of 10 MT to 20 MT and flight rates less than 200 flights/year.
To achieve this goal, vehicle concepts had to be highly operable and reliable, require very little
maintenance between flights, have sufficient system and subsystem robustness (typically
substantial design margins), and contain long life airframe and engine components. HRST-class
vehicles typically require no more than $3M - $4M in labor, propellant, and replacement hardware
per flight. Airframe service life is on the order of 1000 flights and engine service life is on the
order of 500 flights. By comparison, the current Space Shuttle system requires more than $350M
in recurring costs per flight, and its service life is around 100 flights for the Orbiter airframe and
only a few flights between major overhauls for the main engines.
The four HRST-class vehicles investigated in this SSP study were:
1. Argus with Maglifler launch assist
2. Hyperion
3. ACRE-92
4. SSTO-R with rocket sled launch assist
Argus
Argus is a rocket-based combined-cycle (RBCC) single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) launch vehicle
utilizing a Maglev sled and track system to accelerate it to Mach 0.8 for horizontal liftoff. Argus
uses two LOX/LH2 supercharged ejector ramjet (SERJ) engines for primary motive power and
transitions from airbreathing to rocket mode at Mach 6. Like the rest of the vehicles considered,
Argus is unpiloted and operates autonomously from liftoff to landing. Argus employs a lightweight
composite airframe in a high fineness ratio, axisymmetric wing-body configuration. Advanced
subsystem and material technologies are used throughout. For example, the wings and other highly
loaded structures are made of advanced metal matrix composites such as Titanium-aluminide.
Propellant tanks are graphite/epoxy. Subsystems include high power density fuel cells, EMA's,
lightweight avionics and power distribution, and built-in test monitoring sensors. Thermal
protection is all passive with a combination of TUFI ceramic tiles, TABI blankets, and ultra-high
temperature ceramic (UHTC) nosecap and leading edges.
Hyperion
Hyperion is a horizontal takeoff, horizontal landing RBCC SSTO launch vehicle. It is
powered by five LOX/LH2 ejector scramjet engines, but is also equipped with a separate pair of
ducted fans for limited subsonic landing operations. Hyperion operates in airbreathing scramjet
NAGS-1547 Supplemental White Paper jro/l 2.98/2

mode up to Mach 10 and requires significant airframe-engine integration. The Hyperion forebody
is conical on the bottom and elliptical on the top. The aftbody provides an expansion surface for the
engine exhaust. Airframe and subsystem technologies are similar to those in Argus. Both Argus
and Hyperion were entered into the original HRST vehicle evaluation process by John Olds of
Georgia Tech.
ACRE-92
ACRE-92 is a vertical takeoff, horizontal landing LOX/LH2 all-rocket launch vehicle. It is
powered by five new long life, high thrust-to-weight rocket engines (T/W = 92 at sea level).
Landing is unpowered. It employs a wing-body configuration similar to that found on the all-
rocket SSTO from NASA's Access to Space study. Subsystem and materials technologies are
consistent with Argus. ACRE-92 was originally entered into the HRST study by Dan Levack of
Boeing Rocketdyne.
SSTO-R with Rocket Sled Launch Assist (SSTO-R/LA)
The SSTO-R/LA is a horizontal takeoff, horizontal SSTO rocket vehicle. Like Argus, it
employs a launch assist system to achieve an initial velocity and eliminate the need for heavy
takeoff gear. In this case the launch assist system is a rocket-powered sled and track system and
the launch speed is only Mach 0.25. Main propulsion for the SSTO-R/LA vehicle is provided by
three lightweight LOX/LH2 rocket engines. The vehicle configuration is a medium fineness ratio
wing-body. Subsystem and materials technologies are consistent with Argus. The SSTO-R/LA
was entered into the HRST study by Gordon Woodcock formerly of Boeing Huntsville.
For the present study, all four HRST concepts were (originally) modified to deliver 20 MT
and were "leveled" to the same technology assumptions. In addition, Georgia Tech worked with
NASA Kennedy Space Center to identify changes in the vehicles that will help to increase the
operability of the concepts and reduce their associated operations costs. Key were the increase in
vehicle design "margin" (factors of safety on structural components and landing gear), de-rating
engines to 90% of design thrust, increasing the use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) subsystem
components to reduce inventory costs, eliminating active airframe cooling where possible,
reducing numbers of distinct fluids on board, and integrating tankage where possible. These
"operability" versions of the SSP/HRST concepts are documented in the attached presentation
materials. Drawings, weight statements, and lists of changes since HRST are also given.
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SSP Evaluation Procedure:
This project was performed in three phases. Phase 1 examined the economic performance of
all four vehicle concepts when configured to deliver 20 MT payloads in support of a MEO-based
Suntower mission model. Phase 2 performed several trade studies on payload size, Suntower mass
and deployment schedule, and government economic incentives for the leading concept from phase
1 - the SSTO-R/LA. Phase 3 examined the Argus and SSTO-R/LA concepts in support of a new,
larger GEO-based Suntower architecture. Detailed results are shown in the attached presentation
materials. Specific processes and issues are reviewed below.
SSP Payload Size, Packaging, and Destination
In all cases, the candidate RLV was assumed to deliver containerized payload components to
a circular LEO parking orbit (300 km). These packages are to be subsequently delivered to the
Suntower assembly orbit by an (uninvestigated) space-based orbital transfer system for robotic
assembly. Over the mission model (about 250 flights/year for the first two phases and over 450
flights/year for phase 3) the RLV's were assumed to average 95% of their maximum payload
capacity on a given flight. This presents a somewhat demanding packaging challenge to the
Suntower designers, but we have assumed this type of manifesting percentage would be possible,
if not necessary, for such as long term transportation problem. During phase 1 and phase 2, the
containerized payloads were assumed to average 19 MT (95% of 20 MT) with a volume of 226 m 3.
In phase 3 (and the 40 MT payload trade study in phase 2), the average payload was increased to
38 MT (95% of 40 MT) with a volume of 452 m 3. Payload volumes are the same across all four
vehicle concepts, but the particular cargo bay shape (cylinder, square, etc.) changes depending on
the best match for the launch vehicle configuration.
Two payload destination cases were originally run for each vehicle - one case was launched
from Kennedy Space Center to a 300 km circular, 28.5 ° inclination orbit and a second case
simulated a launch from a fictitious launch site near the equator to a 0° inclination orbit. MECO
conditions were a 94 km x 281 km elliptical orbit in both cases. The remaining AV was performed
by on-board cryogenic OMS propulsion (sized for 183 m/s on-orbit AV). Performance parameters
between these two sites were slight (measured in terms of propellant mass fraction required).
During this study, the mode of transportation to be used for in-space transportation was yet to be
determined. Therefore it was unclear whether the orbital transfer system could remove 28.5 ° of
plane change by itself or if the launch system would be required to place the payload packages
directly into an equatorial orbit. The results presented on the attached charts assume that the launch
site is equatorial, therefore the vehicle sizes and weight-based investment costs are slightly
optimistic for a KSC launch. However, the burden on the in-space transportation component to
perform a plane change is eliminated.
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Vehicle Synthesis Process
POST was used to perform the trajectory optimization for each vehicle. Mass Ratios,
LOX/LH2 mixture ratios, and wing loadings were determined from these analyses. Georgia Tech
already had trajectory files for Argus and Hyperion (our entries into the HRST study), but new
POST trajectory models were created for ACRE-92 and SSTO-R/LA. Aerodynamic data was
generated for each concept using APAS. Mass properties were determined using Georgia Tech's
in-house mass estimating relationship spreadsheets. Similar technology assumptions and weight
reductions were made for each vehicle. "Operability" considerations were also included for each
vehicle as described later. Propulsion parameters (Isp, thrusts) were determined using Georgia
Tech's in-house SCORES code for the two rocket vehicles (ACRE-92 and SSTO-R/LA) and with
our SCCREAM code for the two RBCC-powered vehicles (Argus and Hyperion).
To converge a given design, the aerodynamic dataset was first generated and subsequently
scaled photographically as necessary. Several iterations were typically required between
propulsion, mass properties, and trajectory optimization to converge internal performance variables
for each concept. These iterations were performed by a team of graduate student engineers at
Georgia Tech. The result of this iterative synthesis process was a "closed" vehicle design in each
case, a multi-level weight statement for each vehicle, and a converged outer mold line geometry
(length, wingspan, etc.).
Economic Assessment Following Vehicle Synthesis
After the designs were converged, Georgia Tech's in-house cost estimation and economic
simulation tool CABAM was used to estimate vehicle DDT&E and theoretical first unit (TFU) costs
for each vehicle. These analyses depend on NAFCOM-style weight-based cost estimating
relationships with complexity factor adjustments for each engine or other component made by
analysts at Georgia Tech. For a given fleet size, overall fleet procurement costs were estimated
using an 80% learning curve for units produced beyond the first. Facilities costs, operations costs,
and financing costs were other key inputs into the economic analysis. SSP revenue was assumed
to be $400/kg in all cases (except for a trade study on that variable in phase 2)
Facilities Costs
A simplified construction of facilities model was used in throughout the economic analyses in
this study. The simplified facilities model assumes that Maglev ($800M each) and rocket-sled
launch facilities ($150M each) can support up to 200 flights each per year. A simple runway like
that used by Hyperion can support multiple flights per day if necessary. On the other hand, a
vertical takeoff launch pad, like that used by ACRE-92, can support only 50 flights per year per
facility ($500M each). For all concepts, payload processing facilities must be augmented for each
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additional 50 flights per year ($50M base and an additional $50M per 50 annual flights). Similarly,
vehicle maintenance and depot facilities were assumed to be incremented for each 5 flight vehicles
added to the fleet ($10M for each 5 vehicles in the fleet). In all cases, the funding for these ground
facilities was assumed to be provided by the government (or some international governmental
partnership) not the RLV company. The RLV company was assumed to pay a $50,000 user fee per
flight to offset the cost of operating and maintaining the facilities. This proves to be an important
assumption for increasing the IRR returned to RLV, Inc. Due to dollar discounting, the importance
of up-front costs in determining the economic performance of a concept is greatly magnified.
Operations Costs
Operations cost per flight for each of the different concepts and their expected turnaround
time (flights per airframe per year) were key inputs to the CABAM model. The requisite cost per
flight numbers as a function of flight rate were extrapolated from data generated by Mike Nix from
NASA - Marshall using the OCM/COMET tool originally developed by General Dynamics. An
OCM/COMET model for HRST vehicles was obtained from the Operability Wing of NASA's on-
line Virtual Research Center. This model was used to predict several operations cost per flight for
all four concepts at a range of annual flight rates. This data was then used to create regression
models of ops costs vs. flight rate for each concept. OCM/COMET includes labor charges,
propellant costs, and maintenance hardware costs (LRU's). Georgia Tech added $50,000 per flight
to this base number to account for liability and hull insurance payments in additional to the $50,000
site use fee described above.
It should be noted that this ops model was originally created by Mr. Nix for the HRST study,
not specifically for the SSP study. The latter has higher flight rates and a 20 MT payload.
However, our assumption has been that this model and data from it are still applicable to the
current SSP study. Operations costs are a significant input to the overall life cycle cost model, and
the validity of this assumption should perhaps be updated and revised in future analyses.
In general, the OCM/COMET model shows a significant decrease in per flight operations
costs at high flight rates, asymptotically approaching a value of under $4M/launch at flight rates
near several hundred per year. Hyperion is consistently the lowest operations cost vehicle, Argus
second, ACRE-92 third, and SSTO-R/LA the most expensive (however, differences are less than
$0.75M per flight at higher rates). During phase 3, the payload was increased to 40 MT for Argus
and SSTO-R/LA. For these 40 MT cases, the construction of facilities costs were increased by
15%, the base ops costs per flight from OCM/COMET were increased by 10% per flight, and
incremental propellant costs were included directly for each concept (10¢/lb for additional LOX and
25¢/lb for additional LH2).
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Operability Changes to the Vehicles
Our Georgia Tech team worked with engineers from Kennedy Space Center to predict vehicle
turnaround times for each of the four initial concepts. The KSC team used their new Architectural
Assessment Tool (AAT) to predict the number of flights per vehicle airframe per year. An early
preliminary assessment determined that no HRST vehicle would have a flight rate of more than
about 26 flights per airframe per year (Argus) or about a two week turnaround time. The KSC
team led by Edgar Zapata, Carey McCleskey, and Rus Rhodes, recommended a number of
changes to each of the initial HRST vehicles to increase their operability. As documented in the
attached presentations, primary changes consisted of adding extra margin in key structural
components, de-rating the engines to 90% thrust to reduce stress and increase engine life, and
increasing the use of COTS components in the subsystems. In addition, heavy use of operations
technologies such as vehicle health monitoring and automated checkout are required. As a result of
these changes, the SSP-version vehicle sizes and weights generally increased by 5% - 10%, but
annual utilization rates increased to over 34 flights per airframe per year in all cases. Argus even
increased to 46 flights per airframe per year. Note that the KSC model did not predict data for the
SSTO-R/LA vehicle. Turnaround times for that vehicle were estimated by Georgia Tech personnel
based on expected relationships with the other three vehicles.
Fleet Size - Turnaround time vs. Service Life
An interesting finding regarding fleet size resulted from our turnaround improvement efforts.
Our initial assumption from HRST was that individual airframes have service lives of only 1000
flights before retirement (engines have 500 flight service lives). The required fleet size is
determined from either service life or annual flight rate. For example, the phase 1 model required
8,440 flights over 30 years and thus 9 vehicles were required in the fleet. By turnaround time, the
peak annual flight rate of 307 flights would require only 7 airframes for Argus (i.e.
roundup(307/46)). Thus the service life turned out to be the dominating factor in determining fleet
size. This relationship held true for all vehicle and all phases of the current SSP project. This result
suggests that the assumption on a 1000 flight service life should be revisited in future studies. Is a
longer airframe life possible and/or justified? Unfortunately, current analysis tool and mechanisms
employed in conceptual design are inadequate to predict service life from the limited vehicle detail
available in the early phases of design. In fact, any differentiation of service life between the four
concepts could not even be reliably estimated for this study.
Calculation of Overall Economic Metrics
CABAM was used throughout the study to predict economic performance parameters for
each vehicle/mission scenario. Key assumptions made at the beginning of the study and held
constant throughout the three phases include: government offset of 20% of the airframe and 100%
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of the development costs (but none of the production), government funding for 100% of ground
facility construction, a constant source of revenue from SSP at the rate of $400/kg of payload
delivered, low interest rate, government-backed loan rates of 10% and later 7.5%, and a 3:1 debt-
to-equity ratio model for raising necessary capital for RLV, Inc. From these assumptions (and
other assumptions regarding corporate tax rates, discount rates, and depreciation schedules),
CABAM can be used to estimate key economic parameters such as IRR (based on constant-year
earnings before interest and taxes) and net present value. An overriding economic goal of this
study was to achieve an RLV, Inc. IRR of greater than 20%.
There are several issues that result from these assumptions that should be highlighted. As
previously mentioned, dollar discounting means that up-front government contributions are very
important to increase the resultant IRR. This is especially true of construction of facilities.
However, the assumption made in the current study that the government would offset 100% of
facilities has the effect of artificially favoring more expensive ground facilities (since RLV, Inc.
doesn't pay!). For example, Argus uses a very expensive (over $3B) set of Magnetic-levitation
track facilities to reduce the size and cost of the flight vehicle. The Maglev track essentially serves
as a "free" first stage for Argus paid by the government while there is no such advantage for
Hyperion. Some of the economic results in this study would have to be revisited if an _ (or
even a zero) government contribution was made to each concept for facilities and other non-
recurring costs. Put another way, Argus and SSTO-R/LA may look better than the other
competitors largely because of unequal government contributions.
The assumption that the debt-to-equity ratio of privately raised capital would be kept in a 3:1
ratio essentially keeps the same proportion of debt for each concept and mission considered.
However, concepts that require larger non-recurring investments require the RLV developer to
raise more absolute equity funding at the beginning of the scenario. The issue to an RLV developer
might be, is it better to have a scenario with 22% IRR but requires $5B of startup equity, or one
that has an 18% IRR with $4B of startup equity? In this study, preference was given to the higher
IRR and the issue of raising adequate equity was left unresolved.
Phase 1 Study Results and Issues:
In phase 1, all four concepts were evaluated against the (then baseline) MEO Suntower
constellation outlined in the attached presentation materials. This scenario called for the delivery of
one 4850 MT Suntower to orbit annually for 30 years (in 19 MT pieces). With the 10%
refurbishment schedule on 10 year cycles also assumed, resultant flight rates ranged from 251 per
year to 307 per year. The interest rate for private debt financing was assumed to be 10% for this
phase. The two preferred concepts emerging from this phase were the SSTO-R/LA concept and
Argus. Argus had the advantage of low operations costs, but the SSTO-R/LA vehicle had the
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lowest DDT&E and fleet procurement costs, and also had a lower initial debt requirement and
lower financial costs. IRR's for both concepts were calculalr,.zi to be only a mediocre 7.9%. SSTO-
R/LA had a slightly better net present value, although all NPV's were negative when using a 25%
discount rate. Recall that SSTO-R/LA also has lower facihties requirements, and this also requires
a lower government investment. While it's economic performance was not even close to the
required 20% IRR goal (in fact costs per kg were already near the expected $400/kg SSP price
without including profit!), the SSTO-R/LA was considered the best option in phase 1 by a slight
margin over Argus.
Hyperion and ACRE-92 performed relatively poorly in this initial assessment. Hyperion had
the lowest operational costs, but it's highest overall non-recurring expenses and resultant financing
costs caused it's IRR to suffer. ACRE-92 had a combination of high DDT&E and procurement
costs (second only to Hyperion) and the second highest ops costs. In addition, ACRE-92 resulted
in the highest facilities requirement to the government. IRR's for these two concepts were found to
be less than 5.5%.
Phase 2 Study Results and Issues:
Phase 2 work consisted of several trade studies and sensitivity analyses for the SSTO-R/LA
vehicle. Debt interest rate, Suntower deployment rate, Suntower mass, vehicle payload capacity
and additional commercial Space Transportation Study (CSTS) market overlays were the primary
variables considered. The results are documented in the attached presentation materials.
7.5% Interest Rate
At the suggestion of NASA study participants, a 7.5% "optimistic" government loan
guarantee program was considered and this was found to decrease financing costs for the baseline
case by nearly $4B over the 30 year mission model. In support of this scenario, it has been pointed
out that there has been some discussion among members of the U. S. House of Representatives
regarding the feasibility of such a low rate guarantee. While this does not affect IRR since IRR was
calculated before interest and taxes, it does significantly lower the life cycle cost of the venture.
CSTS Markets
Similarly, adding the CSTS commercial and government LEO cargo delivery markets was
found to add as many as 350 flights per year to the SSP mission model and significantly increase
revenues and IRR. Two options were considered for the CSTS market overlays. In the first case,
the CSTS market were afforded the same low $400/kg price that SSP had negotiated as an "anchor
tenant". This created the most new markets and flights, but did not necessarily maximize profits on
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those markets for RLV, Inc. In the second case, the commercial and government CSTS market
prices were optimized to provide the most financial return to RLV, Inc. This meant charging more
per kg of payload and reducing flights and markets, but also reducing costs of operations and new
vehicles purchases. The IRR of the optimized CSTS overlay increased IRR by more than 7
percentage points. Optimized prices resulting from this analysis were approximately $1700/kg for
commercial CSTS payloads and $3000/kg for (less price elastic) government payloads. SSP
payload price was always held to $400/kg.
Suntower Mass vs. Deployment Rate
At the second SSP Technical Interchange Meeting, it was suggested by Jay Penn of the
Aerospace Corporation that higher flight rates would be necessary to reduce operations costs for
future RLV's to the levels required by SSP. Increasing deployment rates to 1.5/year or 3/year (and
thus decreasing the constellation deployment period) has that effect, but the lower per flight
operations costs were not found to offset the costs of larger facilities and fleet sizes required to
support that traffic. However, increased traffic due to larger individual Suntower mass was found
to be very beneficial to the RLV economic scenario. Essential, a larger Suntower mass increases
the total mass delivered to orbit over the 30 year deployment period and thus the total revenue is
increased.
This is an interesting situation for the overall SSP venture. Increasing Suntower mass helps
the RLV developer's economic scenario (where the ETO transportation fees are revenue), but
almost certainly hurts the economic scenario for SSP, Inc. (where the ETO transportation fees are
expenses). The impact of increasing mass on the SSP, Inc. economic scenario was not considered
by researchers at Georgia Tech.
Vehicle Payload Mass
NASA SSP program participants also suggested that larger payload vehicle payload
capacities might be beneficial, and this was found to be true for the SSTO-R/LA system
investigated in phase 2. 10MT, 20 MT, and 40 MT SSTO-R/LA configurations were considered.
Larger payload vehicles have larger DDT&E, larger procurement costs, larger facilities costs, and
larger operations costs (due to fewer flights per year and a larger vehicle). However, the revenue
of a 40 MT payload vehicle is twice that of a 20 MT vehicle per flight. Costs per flight were only
found to increase by about 50% per flight while revenues increased by 100% over the baseline 20
MT vehicle case.
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Phase 3 Study Results and Issues:
In October of 1998, a beneficial change in the Suntower configuration and deployment
schedule was made by overall SSP study participants lead by Harvey Feingold of SAIC. The MEO
Suntower constellation was abandoned in favor of a larger, GEO-based constellation of 30
Suntowers. These larger Suntowers had over triple the mass per Suntower of the MEO Suntowers
(15561 MT vs. 4850 MT). This proved to be exactly the type of change that was necessary to
make the RLV economic scenario attractive. Phase 3 efforts at Georgia Tech adopted the CSTS
overlay, the 40 MT payload, and the 7.5% interest rate from phase 2 and reexamined Argus and
SSTO-R/LA for the new GEO Suntower mission scenario. For this scenario, annual flight rates
ranged from 410 to 497 for just the SSP missions. Note that it was hypothesized that Argus might
be more attractive at these higher flight rates based on its lower ops costs, hence the reason for
reexamining that particular concept.
IRR's for phase 3 were over 22% for both Argus and SSTO-R/LA for the basic GEO SSP
model. With the optimized CSTS overlay, IRR's increased to nearly 25%. Argus had a slight
advantage in phase 3 cost/kg due to lower ops costs, but IRR's of the two vehicles are very close
due to the lower up-front costs of SSTO-R/LA. Over the 30 mission model, best case revenues for
the optimized CSTS overlay are close to $240B for RLV, Inc. while total life cycle costs incurred
are near $80B (in 1998 dollars).
In our experience, achieving the goal of 20% IRR requires cost per kg payload to be less than
1/2 of the expected price per kg. That is, overall life cycle cost per kg of payload delivered should
be less than $200/kg for this model. For Argus, the best case costs were $147/kg. For SSTO-
R/LA, the best case costs were $160/kg. Achieving this low cost goal was the result of a
combination of several factors.
1. Having sufficient total flights in the model to amortize vehicle DDT&E and fleet costs
2. Achieving very low operations cost with new ways of doing ops and high annual flights
3. Augmenting "anchor" SSP revenues with CSTS market traffic to increase profits
4. Reducing financing costs for initial capital (low interest loans, smaller cheaper vehicles)
5. Government assistance to reduce up-front costs (facilities/launch assist, and DDT&E offsets)
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Overall Study Conclusions:
The results from phase 3 of this study support the conclusion that, y..C..S.,the latest GEO-based
SSP scenario does produce an attractive economic scenario for a potential RLV developer even if
the revenues are limited to only $400/kg. With proper support from the government, the sustained,
high traffic mission model from the SSP creates a steady revenue source that enables RLV, Inc. to
recoup startup costs and still provide an adequate return on investment.
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